Fordham Law School

FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History
All Decisions

Housing Court Decisions Project

2020-03-24

Kushner Vill. 329 E. 9th LLC v. Winkler

Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/housing_court_all

Recommended Citation
"Kushner Vill. 329 E. 9th LLC v. Winkler" (2020). All Decisions. 141.
https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/housing_court_all/141

This Housing Court Decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Housing Court Decisions Project at
FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. It has been accepted for inclusion in All Decisions by
an authorized administrator of FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information,
please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu.

CIVIL COURT OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK
COUNTY OF NEW YORK, HOUSING PART F
----------------------------------------------------------------------X
KUSHNER VILLAGE 329 EAST 9TH LLC
Petitioner, Landlord,
-against-

Index No. L&T 87375/15
DECISION AND ORDER

UTA WINKLER,
Respondent-Tenant
“JOHN DOE” & “JANE DOE”
Respondents-Occupants.
----------------------------------------------------------------------X
FRANCES A. ORTIZ, JUDGE
__________________________________________________________________________
Recitation as required by CPLR 2219(a), of the papers considered in the review of the
petitioner’s motion to restore and respondent’s cross motion to dismiss and for summary
judgment on counterclaims.
Papers
Numbered
Notice of Motion & Affirmation………………………............................................................1
Notice of Cross Motion, Affirmation & Affidavit………………………….............................2
Affirmation & Affidavit in Opposition to Cross Motion...........................................................3
Affirmation & Affidavit in Reply……………..…………...………………………………….4
_____________________________________________________________________________
Upon the foregoing cited papers, the Decision/Order of this Court on these consolidated
motions is as follows:
This a non-payment proceeding that was initially filed in December 2015. On June 13,
2017 respondent agreed per two attorney stipulation to pay petitioner post-petition use and
occupancy of $19, 655.521 by July 14, 2017. Subsequently, the matter was settled on January
1

The stipulation does not indicate the specific time frame for the $19,655.52. Per the 2015
petition the monthly rent for the premises was $1,637.96.
1

12, 2018 pursuant to another stipulation. The terms indicated that the parties agreed upon a
contractor performing remediation2 work at the premises with access on February 2018.
Petitioner agreed to compensate respondent for a hotel stay as may be required during the work.
The case was marked off calendar.
PETITIONER’S MOTION IN CHIEF
Then, on April 22, 2019 petitioner moved to restore the matter, amend the petition
through April 2019, and for final judgment and issuance of a warrant of eviction. Petitioner in
the motion claimed that respondent breached the June 13, 2017 stipulation because she did not
pay on going use and occupancy, although she paid the agreed $19, 655.52. (Mironenko Affir’m
¶ 9). However, upon this Court’s review of that stipulation, there is no language in the
stipulation requiring ongoing payment of use and occupancy. On default of respondent the
motion to restore the matter was granted per order of Judge Michelle Schreiber dated April 22,
2019. The order restored the matter to the calendar on May 7, 2019. Neither side appeared on
May 7, 2019, as a result the case was dismissed.
The instant motion by petitioner seeks to vacate the dismissal. According to counsel for
petitioner, there was a miscommunication with respondent’s newly retained counsel. Based on
the miscommunication, their stipulation adjourning the matter to June 4, 2019 was not filed with
the court resulting in the default dismissal. (Mironenko Affir’m ¶s 7 & 8).

According to the respondent’s Second Affirmative Defense of breach of warranty of
habitability in her amended answer, there was a flood in her kitchen on or about November 25,
2013. The flood consisted of gushing water from construction in the above apartment. This
caused her kitchen ceiling to collapse.
2

2

A motion court's determination to vacate a default judgment is a discretionary one based
on common law interpretation of statutory law. Deutsche Bank Nat'l Tr. Co. v. Kirschenbaum,
179 A.D.3d 407 (1st Dep’t 2020) citing Nash v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 22 N.Y.3d 220, 226
(2013). If a party shows a reasonable excuse for a default and a meritorious cause of action, the
dismissal may be vacated. Grant v. Rattoballi, 57 A.D.3d 272 (1st Dep’t 2008); (CPLR 5015).
Here, petitioner’s attorney in his affirmation has provided a reasonable excuse for the default on
May 7, 2019 in that there was a miscommunication between the attorneys. This resulted in a
failure to file the adjournment stipulation. (Mironenko Affir’m ¶s 7 & 8). Petitioner has
provided a reasonable excuse for the default and a facially meritorious claim3 to the non-payment
petition where he can seek to amend the petition to date. (Mironenko Affir’m ¶s 13 & 16 - to
initial motion to restore dated April 22, 2020). Under these circumstances, the petitioner’s
motion to restore the matter and vacate the dismissal is granted. Accordingly, the default
dismissal is vacated.
RESPONDENT’S CROSS MOTION FOR DISMISSAL
Respondent opposes petitioner’s motion and cross moves for dismissal and summary
judgment on her counterclaims. Specifically, respondent seeks dismissal based on documentary
evidence (CPLR 3211(a) (1)) and Multiple Dwelling Law (MDL) §302, directing disgorgement
of all amounts paid pursuant to court order and use and occupancy, vacating the prior use and
occupancy payments pursuant to recently enacted changes to the RPAPL, and granting summary
judgment to her on issues of liability as to the counterclaims imposed in her amended answer.

3

Any substantive defenses to the underlying non-payment in the answer and cross motion will
be addressed in the cross motion.
3

The basis of respondent’s cross motion to dismiss is that petitioner may not collect rent
for the subject premises because the subject building does not have a proper certificate of
occupancy (“C of O”) from the New York City, Department of Buildings (“DOB”). Based on
the New York City, Department of Finance Tax Assessment records, the subject building was
built in 1900.

Under MDL §301, (1),
No multiple dwelling shall be occupied in whole or in part until the issuance of a
certificate by the department that said dwelling conforms in all respects to the
requirements of this chapter, to the building code and rules and to all other
applicable law, except that no such certificate shall be required in the case of:
and MDL §301 (1) (b) states,

b. Any old-law tenement, or any class A multiple dwelling erected after April
twelfth, nineteen hundred one, which was occupied for two years immediately
before January first, nineteen hundred nine, and in which no changes or
alterations have been made except in compliance with the tenement house law or
this chapter, or wherein:
(1) two or more apartments are combined creating larger residential units, and
(2) the total legal number of families within the building is being decreased, and
(3) the bulk of the buildings is not being increased….

Additionally, MDL §302 (1) (b), indicates:

b. No rent shall be recovered by the owner of such premises for said period, and
no action or special proceeding shall be maintained therefor, or for possession
said premises for nonpayment of such rent.
Specifically, respondent contends that a permanent building-wide C of O is required due
to the construction of a new floor with two new penthouses on the top of the building.
According to DOB, Code Notes, existing buildings must obtain a new or amended C of O when
there is work that changes the use, egress or occupancy of the building. Buildings built before
4

1938 aren’t required to have a Certificate of Occupancy – unless later alterations changed its use,
egress or occupancy. A Temporary Certificate of Occupancy (“TCO”) indicates that the
property or partial property is safe for occupancy. However, TCOs usually expire every 90 days.
If outstanding issues for a permanent C of O have not been completely resolved before the
expiration date, then the TCO may be renewed. No one may legally occupy a building until the
DOB has issued a C of O or TCO. A final C of O will be issued by DOB when the completed
work substantially conforms to the approved plans for a new building or major alteration.
(Exhibit F, www.nyc.gov/buildings).
Respondent attaches to her motion a series of documents from the DOB website
regarding the “job” to add an additional story on top of the existing subject building for one of
the sixth floor penthouses. (Exhibits F & G ). The “job” request was initially made to DOB in
February 2011. According to Exhibit F, the C of O deadline was February 25, 2011. Instead of
issuance of a permanent C of O by the deadline, there have been six TCOs issued for the
building’s sixth floor. (Exhibit G). The most recent TCO expired February 13, 2017. According
to that TCO and the five prior TCOs, petitioner was required to fulfill thirteen (13) outstanding
requirements to obtain a final certificate of occupancy by February 25, 2011. These thirteen
outstanding requirements included: final cost affidavit (PW3), final site survey, street tree sign
off, final plumbing sign off, final electrical sign off, final construction sign off, verify tax lot, C
of O objection with verification of address/TOPO stamp, violations search, open applications
search, folder review, C of O objection “….will need inspection for the rest of floors, before
those floors can be given a..” C of O. (Exhibit F – DOB – B-Scan List of Required Items, pages
2 & 3).
5

In sum, respondent asserts that the additional penthouse units have increased the number
of units in the subject building which requires a new permanent C of O, regardless of the fact
that building was previously “grandfathered in” with no need for a C of O. According to
respondent, this is especially necessary when there has been a complete restructuring of the
building’s stability, firestopping, and other items that need to address the increase load of the
non-fireproof building.
Petitioner in opposition argues that the subject building was constructed prior to 1938 and
as such does not have a requirement for a C of O. (Exhibit C in opposition – building I card).
According to petitioner, it obtained a temporary C of O for the top floor but as the remaining
floors were unaltered, it contends it does not need to obtain a C of O for the continued use of the
other floors. However, petitioner’s counsel does state that “…at the end of the project, the
building would obtain a new certificate of occupancy.” (Hall Affir’m ¶ 19). Petitioner argues
that First Department case law applies the MDL §302 (1) (b) bar to the collection of rent and
non-payment proceeding, only under three different circumstances4, which are inapplicable to
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All of these First Department cases cited by petitioner pre-date Chazon LLC v Maugenest, 19
N.Y.3d 410 (2012). Chazon supra made those three different circumstances or limitations no
longer applicable. “[I]n 2012, the Court of Appeals made it clear that no such limitation was
mandated under the law in its decision in Chazon…” 1165 Fulton Ave HDFC v. Goings, 65
Misc. 3d 1210(A) (Bronx Cty, Civ. Ct. 2019). The Court of Appeals, in Chazon supra., held that
the plain text of Multiple Dwelling Law § 302 (1) (b) bars not only an action to recover rent, but
also an “action or special proceeding . . . for possession of said premises for nonpayment of such
rent...,” if the multiple dwelling building does not have a certificate of occupancy as required by
Multiple Dwelling Law § 301 (1). Further, the Court held that there is nothing anywhere else to
explain how that can be reconciled with the text of the statute. It simply cannot. The Court went
on to say that if it is an undesirable result, the problem is one to be addressed by the Legislature.
6

respondent. First, the C of O violation must render the subject tenant’s unit unlawful. Second,
the arrears sought must be only for the illegal units. Third, the tenant is not complicit in the
existence and maintenance of the illegal apartment.
Petitioner argues that the subject apartment is lawful since the inception of the building
and maintains the same lawful configurations and location. Also, petitioner contends that the
rent sought is for a lawful unit. Lastly, petitioner contends that respondent is not the cause of the
unlawful apartment so the third circumstance is not applicable. Rene Zemp, an agent of the
petitioner, states in her affidavit in opposition that although petitioner applied to add an
additional floor to the subject building and filed the appropriate paper work with DOB, the actual
construction of the additional floor has not commenced. (Zemp Affi’d ¶ 4).
Respondent in reply submits an affidavit from Madeleine Lauve. Ms. Lauve states that
she has been to the subject building on or about February 28, 2019. She took pictures of the
building mailboxes. These photos show door bells buzzers in the marquis area with labels for
Penthouse 1 (PH1) with a name “Sooraj” and Penthouse 2 (PH2) C- with name “Gamboa,” D with name Gamboa and G – with name “Diaz” and PH2 mailboxes (Exhibit E). Ms. Lauve
states, she walked through the building and she actually saw the penthouse doors but did not
actually get into the penthouses. (Lauve Affi’d ¶8). However, she states that the penthouse units
appear to be occupied as of last February. (Lauve Affi’d ¶8).
Respondent’s counsel in her reply affirmation states that in late February 2019, she
visited the subject building. She personally observed the interior public hallways, building
marquis area buzzer listing all the tenants including the two penthouse apartments. She walked
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up the stairs, saw the doors leading to the penthouses, and observed new construction in the
hallways including a sprinkler system. (LoGuidice Reply Affir’m ¶s 36 & 37).
Additionally, respondent in reply contends that there is no issue of fact that adding a
whole floor to the subject building requires a certificate of occupancy. Respondent argues that
adding a whole floor increases the bulk of a building. Respondent, also, contends that
construction finished on the penthouses as far back as five years ago in 2015.
In support of the contention that the petitioner has fully erected the two penthouses on the
building’s sixth floor and even advertised them for rental as far as 2015, respondent annexes
copies of internet screen shot pages of Street Easy for PH1. Exhibit C contains seven pages of
Street Easy histories as recent as January 2020 showing PH1 at $3,200 monthly rent and PH2 at
$4,500 monthly rent, photographs of PH1 bathroom and full description of the one bedroom, one
bath penthouse with private patio. Another page shows the unit history for PH1 with rental
history as far back as August 24, 2015 at $3,200 monthly, and another page showing a
photograph of PH2 bedroom with 10 other screen shot pages of the unit. Respondent also
submits pictures of the outside of the subject building from the back yard side showing the top
floor units with a different brick face color from the rest of the floors. (Exhibit D to reply).
Then, Exhibit G to the reply shows older photos from www.propertyshark.com showing the
original configuration of the subject building without the penthouse units.
Lastly, respondent notes that there is a DOB partial stop work order on the subject
building, since May 2018. (Exhibit F to reply). Further, this Court takes judicial notice of the
DOB website indicating that there is a partial stop work order on the building issued by the
Borough Commissioner due to audit objections PW-1 Section 26 and failure to certify correction
8

of class 1 violation. (https://www1.nyc.gov/site/buildings/homeowner/certificate-of-occupancypage).
DISCUSSION ON CROSS MOTION FOR DISMISSAL
The pleading in a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 is afforded a liberal
construction. CPLR 3026. The facts alleged on the complaint or petition must be accepted as
true and afford the plaintiff or petitioner the benefit of every possible inference and determine
only whether the facts alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory. Leon v Martinez, 84 N.Y.2d
83 (1994); Fishberger v Voss, 51 A.D.3d 627 ( 2nd Dep’t 2008); Gillings v. New York Post, No.
100138/16, 2018 WL 5812026, at *1 ( 2nd Dep’t. 2018) (quoting Granada Condominium III
Assn. v. Palomino, 78 A.D.3d 996 ( 2nd Dep’t 2010). A dismissal is warranted only if the
documentary evidence submitted resolves all factual issues as a matter of law and conclusively
establishes a defense to the asserted claim as a matter of law. CPLR 3211(a) (1); Matter of
Walker, 117 A.D.3d 838, 839 ( 2nd Dep’t 2014).
Furthermore, if the evidence submitted in support of the motion is not “documentary,”
the motion must be denied. CPLR 3211(a) (1); Prott v Lewin & Baglio, LLP, 150 A.D.3d 908
(2nd Dep’t 2017). To constitute documentary evidence, the evidence “…must be unambiguous,
authentic, and undeniable.” Granada Condominium III Assn. v Palomino, supra at 997.
Documentary evidence can include judicial records and documents reflecting out-of-court
transactions such as mortgages, deeds, contracts, and any other papers, the contents of which are
essentially undeniable. Prott v Lewin & Baglio, LLP, supra.
Here, the documentary evidence submitted by respondent in support of the motion
undeniably shows that petitioner has not obtained a permanent nor current temporary certificate
9

of occupancy for the subject building, despite the documentary proof that a whole top floor has
been added to the subject building. Binn v. Muchnick, Golieb & Golieb, P.C., 180 A.D.3d 598
(1st Dep’t 2020). This Court took judicial notice of information from the DOB and Department
of Finance websites on the subject building. Specifically, this Court took notice of the fact that
the building was constructed in 1900 and that petitioner did not show compliance with the
thirteen (13) outstanding DOB requirements needed to obtain a permanent C of O from the
agency, the expired TCOs and the partial stop work order for the building.
Buildings built before 1938 are not required to have a C of O, unless later alterations
changed its use, egress or occupancy. Although the subject building was constructed in 1900
and prior to 1938, the addition of an entire floor on the top of the building constitutes a
substantial alteration, thereby requiring petitioners to obtain a C of O for the entire building. W.
47th Holdings LLC v. Eliyahu, 64 Misc. 3d 133(A) (AT 1st Dep’t 2019).
Explicitly, other documentary evidence includes photographs of the exterior of the
subject building showing an additional floor and of the door buzzers in marquis area and
mailboxes for the penthouse apartments, Street Easy internet advertisement showing screen shot
pages of the interior of the penthouse apartments as far back as August 2015, and the DOB
documents showing petitioner’s request to add the top floor. (Exhibits C, D & E to reply and
Exhibits F & G to the cross motion).
Further, this documentary evidence resolves all factual issues and conclusively
establishes respondent’s defense to the petitioner’s asserted claim of non-payment of rent as a
matter of law. Specifically, the defense establishes that under Multiple Dwelling Law § 302 no
rent is collectible by the petitioner when a building lacks a valid certificate of occupancy

if the dwelling is occupied in whole or in part in violation of Multiple Dwelling Law § 301(1).
Multiple Dwelling Law § 302(1)(b). Therefore, petitioner cannot maintain this non-payment of
rent proceeding. GVS Properties LLC v. Vargas, 172 A.D.3d 466 (1st Dep’t 2019); 49 Bleecker,
Inc. v. Gatien, 157 A.D.3d 619, 620 (1st Dep’t 2018); Chazon, LLC v. Maugenest, supra.
Nor may the owner of such dwelling maintain an action or special proceeding for
possession of the premises for nonpayment of rent, even if the tenant's apartment was not one of
the newly created apartments. “If that is an undesirable result, the problem is one to be
addressed by the Legislature.” Chazon, 19 N.Y.3d at 416, supra. The intent of Multiple Dwelling
Law § 302 (1) (b) is to benefit and further the public interest in the safety of buildings. Cashew
Holdings, LLC v. Thorpe-Poyser, 66 Misc. 3d 127(A) (AT 2nd Dep’t 2019). Accordingly,
respondent’s cross motion to dismiss based on documentary evidence is granted for the reasons
discussed above. The petition is dismissed.
RESPONDENT’S CROSS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT on
COUNTERCLAIMS
Respondent cross moves for summary judgment on the issue of liability as to two
counterclaims imposed in her amended answer. These include breach of warranty of habitability
and legal fees pursuant to RPL §234.
Summary judgment is appropriate where the movant establishes the claim by tender of
evidentiary proof in admissible form sufficiently to warrant the court as a matter of law to direct
judgment in its favor. Rodriguez v. City of New York, 31 N.Y.3d 312, 317 (2018); Friends of
Animals, Inc. v Associated Fur Manufacturers, Inc., 46 N.Y.2d 1065 (1979). The failure to make
11

such a prima facie showing requires denial of the motion regardless of the sufficiency of the
opposing papers. Alvarez v Prospect Hospital, 68 N.Y.2d 320 (1986). Here, respondent has not
submitted evidentiary proof in admissible form sufficiently to warrant the court as a matter of
law to direct judgment in her favor on the breach of warranty of habitability and attorney’s fees.
First, the counterclaim in the answer as to the breach of warranty of habitability and the
affidavit of respondent does not sufficiently establish a basis for judgment in her favor without a
trial. Accordingly, the matter is set down for a trial on respondent’s counterclaim for breach of
warranty of habitability. Second, the request for summary judgment on the attorney’s fees
counterclaim in the answer is denied without prejudice to submission of respondent’s lease
showing an attorney’s fees provision.
Lastly, respondent seeks disgorgement of all amounts paid pursuant to court order and
use and occupancy in this proceeding and vacatur of the prior use and occupancy payments
pursuant to recently enacted changes to the RPAPL.
While Multiple Dwelling Law § 302 does not by its own terms provide for the recovery of
rent previously paid for in use and occupancy, when read harmoniously with Multiple Dwelling
Law § 3255, it does not allow for the recovery of such back rent voluntarily paid. Goho Equities
v. Weiss, 149 Misc. 2d 628, 631 (AT 1st Dep’t 1991). Moreover, respondent in the June 13, 2017

“If a resident of an unregistered dwelling voluntarily pays rent or an installment of rent when
he had a right to withhold the same under this subdivision, he shall not thereafter have any claim
or cause of action to recover back the rent or installment of rent so paid. A voluntary payment
within the meaning of this subdivision means payment other than one made pursuant to judgment
in an action or special proceeding.” Multiple Dwelling Law § 325 (2)
5
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stipulation voluntarily agreed to pay the $19, 655.52 in use and occupancy. Contrary to
respondent’s contention, there is no language in that stipulation indicating payment of use and
occupancy was made without prejudice. Accordingly, respondent’s request to disgorge all
amounts paid pursuant to court order and use and occupancy is denied.
The relief that seeks vacatur of the prior use and occupancy payments pursuant to
recently enacted changes to the RPAPL is denied as moot for the reasons already discussed
above and based on the dismissal of the non-payment petition.
The matter is restored to the Part F calendar on May 19, 2020 at 9:30 a.m. for trial on
respondent’s breach of warranty of habitability counterclaim.
ORDERED that petitioner’s motion to restore is granted,
And it is Further
ORDERED that respondent’s cross motion for dismissal is granted,
And it is Further
ORDERED that respondent’s cross motion for summary judgment is denied.
This is the decision and order of the Court, copies of which are being emailed and mailed
to those indicated below.
Dated: New York, NY
March 24, 2020
____________/S_________________
Frances A. Ortiz, JHC

Balsamo, Rosenblatt & Hall
Samara Geller, Esq.
200 Schermerhorn Street
Brooklyn, NY 11201
(718) 858 - 7399

Grimble & LoGuidice, LLP
Robin LoGuidice, Esq.
217 Broadway, Suite 304
New York, NY 10007
(212) 349 - 0450
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Samara@brhlawpc.com

rml@grimblelaw.com
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